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Abstract 
Cooperation between private firms and public research institutes improves knowledge flows between these agents. 
This study analyses the factors associated with decisions in manufacturing firms on whether to engage in Research 
and Development (R&D) cooperation activities and then evaluates the effect of such decisions on the performance 
of these firms. Probit models were used for the estimation of propensity score matching to determine the impact of 
cooperation on the performance of the firms studied. The source of data was the 2008 Technological Innovation 
Survey (Pintec). The results indicate that cooperation positively influences the rate of success in product 
innovations.  
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1. Introduction  
 
In order to stimulate innovative activity, much attention has been given to cooperation agreements on research 
and development (R&D). These agreements are designed to incorporate mechanisms by which firms can profitably 
appropriate and protect knowledge flows. Agreements of this kind are therefore interesting objects for economic 
regulation, which should create appropriate incentives without harming market competition. 
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R&D cooperation agreements have become a topic of interest to public managers. According to López (2006), 
most of the funding for R&D in the European Union (EU) is aimed at stimulating cooperation between private 
firms and public institutions, and among the firms themselves. The underlying logic is that the economic growth 
and performance of the National Innovation System (NIS) can be positively impacted by improved information 
flows (spillovers) generated though these cooperative agreements. 
 In addition to the flows of knowledge and information, Belderbos et al. (2004a) identified three other important 
reasons for firms to engage in R&D cooperation agreements: sharing of costs and risks; skill sharing or 
complementarities; and factors related to the absorptive capacity of the firm. 
 In the first case, cooperation agreements for R&D can be used to determine the rules of sharing costs and risks 
in initiatives where these are high. Therefore, when costs and risks are serious obstacles to innovation, firms would 
tend to engage in cooperation agreements for R&D. 
 In the second case, cooperation agreements for R&D could allow the firms to acquire skills and capabilities 
held by its partners. The greater the availability of technological know-how internalized by the firms, the greater 
the possibility that complementarities will benefit both partners in a cooperation agreement for R&D. 
Finally, in the third case, as the absorptive capacity of a firm (a factor closely related to knowledge flows and 
complementarities) denotes its ability to take advantage of the R&D activities of other firms, the higher the 
absorptive capacity of a firm, the greater the benefits of cooperation agreements for R&D (LÓPEZ, 2006; 
VEUGELERS and CASSIMAN, 2002). 
 Given the above rationale, it is important to examine R&D cooperation agreements in order to assess their 
impact on the performance of innovative firms. In addition, it is vital to elucidate the mechanisms and key factors 
associated with the firm’s decision on whether to participate in R&D cooperation agreements with research 
institutions and other firms, considering the innovative patterns and technological intensity that characterize 
distinct industrial sectors.  
The use of microdata from the Brazilian Technological Innovation Survey (PINTEC), including 16,371 firms 
(14,355 of whom belong to the industry sector and 2,016 to the service sector) to estimate the impact of the 
participation in R&D cooperation agreements on the economic performance of firms is one of the contributions of 
this study to the industrial organization literature. The analysis of the determinants and impacts of R&D 
cooperation for each group of technological intensity, as defined by the OECD taxonomy is another contribution of 
this study. Finally, considering that the Brazilian innovation system is in the early stages of development, this 
study provides important insights for the Brazilian NIS by showing that R&D cooperation is an important element 
for the innovative and consequently economic performance of firms.  
    
2. Methodology  
2.1. Model specification  
In addition to the traditional variables (e.g. sharing of costs and risks, complementarities and absorptive 
capacity of the firms) that have been shown to affect the decision to cooperate, the model postulates the likelihood 
of cooperation as a variable dependent on the spillovers. Two variables were defined to specify spillovers: 
incoming spillovers and appropriability. The first is measured by the importance given to publicly available 
information for the innovative process of the firm). The second form of spillover, appropriability, can be 
understood as the control the firm can exert over outgoing spillovers, and is measured by the importance given to 
multiple strategic methods to control the outflow of commercially sensitive information.  
The rationale with regard to income spillovers it that the greater these spillovers, the greater the scope of 
learning resulting from cooperation agreements for R&D and consequently the marginal benefit derived from such 
agreements. Therefore it is expected that the presence of incoming spillovers has a positive effect on the likelihood 
of cooperation.  
The effect of appropriability on the likelihood of cooperation is not clear, a priori. On the one hand, a low level 
of control over outgoing spillovers (i.e. low appropriability) increases the information flows between firms, and 
then the incoming spillovers that are expected encourage more cooperation for R&D. On the other hand, the 
incentives for a firm to become a free- rider on other firms’ investments reduce both the profitability and stability 
of cooperation agreements. 
 As regards the other variables in the model, the possibility of sharing costs and risks through cooperation is 
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expected to exert a positive effect on the propensity to cooperate for R&D. Similarly, it is expected that the 
presence of complementarities involving technological know-how between firms has a positive effect on the 
likelihood of cooperation for R&D. Since the benefits resulting from R&D cooperation agreements depend on the 
absorptive capacity of firms, it is expected that the higher the firms’ absorption capacity, the greater the returns of 
cooperation agreements for R&D. In this model, the intensity of R&D and the size of the firm are included as 
proxies of the absorptive capacity. Intensity of R&D and firm size positively affect the likelihood that a firm will 
cooperate for R&D. 
In order to capture the industry-specific attributes that are expected to affect the decision to cooperate for R&D, 
the specification of the model includes measures of cooperation and legal protection at the industry level. 
 
2.2. Endogeneity  
Some of the covariates included in the model have great potential to be endogenous. Endogeneity involving 
incoming spillovers, appropriability and intensity of R&D is considered in Veugelers and Cassiman (2002). López 
(2006) considered that the sharing of costs and risks could also be endogenous. 
 The propensity to cooperate for R&D can be correlated with unobserved factors that are systematically related 
to the explanatory variables. López (2006) mentions factors such as the firm’s capacity and quality of 
management, the selected form of governance of R&D activities, openness to new ideas, the degree to which a 
firm's knowledge is tacit or explicit, factors affecting accessibility to a technologically intensive setting and the 
likelihood of repeated interaction with the same partner, and the history and duration of the cooperation 
agreements. 
Another reason for expecting endogeneity is the simultaneity of decisions involving the spillovers, the R&D 
intensity and the sharing of costs and risks. First, cooperation agreements on R&D can be instrumental in 
managing external flows of information. This implies that the decision to cooperate can influence incoming 
spillovers, as well as the level of importance given to strategic methods of appropriation. The simultaneity of the 
decision is also expected to produce endogeneity involving the intensity of R&D and the decision to cooperate. 
The intensity of R&D could increase because of cooperation agreements which improve the effectiveness of 
spending on R&D. Finally, when firms use cooperation agreements to share costs and risks, these agreements 
could influence the level of importance given to the variables identified as obstacles to innovation (LÓPEZ, 2006). 
 
Determination of the endogenous structure of the model 
In their study on the determinants of the R&D cooperation of German firms, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) 
considered appropriability, incoming spillovers and the intensity of R&D as a priori endogenous variables. 
However, when an exogenous variable is treated as endogenous the estimated models lose efficiency, even though 
the estimates remain consistent. 
In order to avoid unnecessary losses of estimator efficiency, in this study we applied a methodology that allows 
us to identify which of the four possible endogenous variables (appropriability, sharing of costs and risks, 
incoming spillovers and intensity of R&D) should be instrumented. 
The methodology consisted, firstly, in estimating a linear probability model (LPM) through two-stage least 
squares (2SLS), using the algorithm of Baum et al. (2007). This technique involves testing the endogeneity of the 
variables under the null hypothesis that the specified regressors cannot be treated as exogenous. If the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, then a Probit model is estimated; otherwise, the C statistic (also known as GMM 
distance or Sargan difference) is estimated. Estimation of the C statistic allows for testing the exogeneity of the 
regressors under the null hypothesis that the regressors analyzed are orthogonal to the errors. 
The final model specifies and tests endogenous variables by rejecting the null hypothesis that the regressors 
specified can be treated as exogenous. It also specifies and tests the variables suspected of endogenicity by not 
rejecting the null hypothesis of the C statistic. 
In order to verify if the instrumental variables are valid, i.e., capable of explaining the instrumented variables 
and uncorrelated with the error term, the algorithm of Baum et al. (2007) was applied. This algorithm involves the 
calculation of Hansen’s J statistic, estimated under the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. 
If the final model (LPM) actually presents endogenous variables, the next step is to estimate a Probit model for 
the instrumentalization of these variables. 
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Probit model with endogenous regressors  
When the determination of the endogenous structure of the model indicates that there are no endogenous 
covariates, a common Probit model can be estimated. However, when there is evidence of endogeneity. the 
common Probit model cannot be used because the maximum likelihood estimators (ML) of Logit and Probit 
models are inconsistent when endogenous regressors are present. 
This study estimated a Probit model with endogenous regressors which specifies the nonlinearity and 
endogeneity in its structure.  
As in the two-stage least squares method (2SLS), implementation of the Probit model with endogenous 
regressors requires one or more valid instruments, which do not explain the dependent variable directly, but are 
correlated with the endogenous regressor.  According to Cameron and Trivedi (2009), considering the linear model 
consisting of the equations (1) and (2), in which yכ is a latent dependent variable in the structural equation, 
representing the innovative firm’s decision on whether or not to cooperate, R&D is a vector of endogenous 
regressors in equation (1). These two variables are modeled as linear in the vectors of exogenous variables. Thus:  
y*1i  = y*2i β  + x’1iγ   + ui       (1) 
y2i     = x’1i π1 + x’2i π2 + Vi       (2) 
where  i = 1.….. N; x1 is a vector of k1×1 of exogenous regressors; x2 is a vector of k2×1 of additional 
instruments that could indirectly impact the decision to cooperate (y1) and, ui and vi are random error terms. 
The variable yכ is latent and is not therefore directly observed. The observed binary result is 1 if yכ > 0, 
indicating that the firm cooperates for R&D and 0 if (yכ ≤ 0) the firm innovates without cooperating for R&D. 
Equation (1) is called structural and is the equation of primary interest. Equation (2) is called a first-stage 
equation or equation in reduced form. The second equation is estimated to instrumentalize the endogenous 
regressors, to check the strength of the instruments and overall quality of the fit of the reduced form.  The 
structural model completely specifies the distribution of y1כ and y2 in equations (1) and (2). Considering the case of 
a Probit with endogenous regressors, it is assumed that (ui. vi) follows a joint normal distribution (CAMERON and 
TRIVEDI, 2009). 
 Thus, when the determination of an endogenous model structure indicates the presence of endogenous 
covariates, the decision to cooperate will be estimated using a Probit model with endogenous regressors, where the 
unobservable propensity to cooperate for R&D (y*1) will be a function of the observed explanatory exogenous 
variables (x1), the possibly endogenous explanatory variables (y2) and the error term (u). 
 
Instruments  
The instruments necessary to estimate the Probit models with endogenous regressors comprise the X2 vector in 
(2). The vector of instruments includes, at the firm level, the basicness of R&D and the intensity of exportation, 
and at the industry level, the incoming spillovers, appropriability, intensity of R&D and cost-risk relation. 
Kamien and Zang (2000) proposed a model in which the benefit a firm obtains from the incoming spillovers 
depends on the characteristics of its R&D activity. Firms where the R&D activity is basic are more likely to take 
advantage of the incoming spillovers. Following this argument, one can expect that the more basic the R&D 
activity, the greater the score of incoming spillovers. The basicness of R&D is approximated by the importance 
given to information ensuing from universities and research institutes to the innovation process. When the 
incoming spillovers are considered an endogenous variable, the basicness of the R&D is included in X2. 
The competitive environment of a firm influences its efforts on strategic protection. The variable intensity of 
exportation is used as a measure of competitiveness in the environment in which the firm operates. The underlying 
premise is that competition is higher in international than in domestic markets. It is then presumed that only the 
most efficient firms are able to take advantage of exportation, so that there is self-selection in these markets 
(MELITZ, 2003). As the international market is considerably dynamic and exportation is a key instrument for the 
performance of the firm (BERNARD and JENSEN, 1999), the assumption is that the higher the intensity of 
exportation, the greater the competition. When appropriability is considered an endogenous variable, export 
intensity is included in X2. 
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2.3. Impact of cooperation on firms’ performance  
Three variables were used to assess the impact of R&D cooperation on the economic performance of the 
innovative firms: net revenue, total revenue, and value of industrial transformation (VIT). Aschhoff and Schmidt 
(2008) adopted a similar procedure to analyze the impact of R&D cooperation on the average costs and sales of 
German companies.  
In the procedure adopted in this study, there is a disadvantage associated to the possibility that the impact of 
R&D cooperation on the economic performance of a firm may not be captured due to an insufficient time interval. 
However, it is worth noticing that the whole analysis takes only innovative firms into account, so that the 
performance of cooperative innovative firms is compared with the performance of firms with analogous path 
dependence. This leads both groups of firms to implement product or process innovations in the same period of 
analysis. 
In addition, the procedure adopted in this study seems suitable for analyzing variables such as the amount 
expended on internal and external R&D and the percentage of public and private funding for R&D activities from 
2006 to 2008. 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) will be employed to evaluate the impact of cooperation for R&D on the 
performance of innovative firms in the manufacturing sector as a treatment effect. The propensity scores used for 
pairing can be easily calculated through Logit or Probit models. The odds obtained in the analysis of the 
determinants of R&D cooperation, in different groups of technological intensity and with different types of 
partners, are then applied for the calculation of the effect of cooperation for R&D. As it is usually simpler to 
control via propensity score than through a large vector, z, of covariates, this method is advantageous. However, it 
is necessary to assess whether the pairing was actually capable of balancing the distribution of covariates in treated 
and untreated groups. 
To evaluate the quality of pairing, the procedures suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) are appropriate 
indicators to assess the balance of the variables used to calculate propensity scores for R&D cooperation.  
 
2.3. Variable definitions and data sources  
This study applies microdata from the 2008 Brazilian Technological Innovation Survey (Pintec), conducted by 
the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). In the case of the industrial sector, the 2008 Pintec 
survey presents national and regional indicators of the technological innovation activities of Brazilian companies 
in the 2006 to 2008 period, which are comparable with information from other countries. The data on the 
companies’ total revenue, net revenue, and value of industrial transformation (VIT), which were taken as measures 
of performance, were obtained from the 2009 Annual Industrial Research (PIA 2009) also carried out by IBGE. 
The variables used in the study are defined below:  
x Appropriability: sum of scores of the importance given to the following strategic methods for the 
protection of inventions or innovations: secrecy; complexity of design; time advantage over competitors; 
x Basicity of R&D: sum of scores for the importance given to the following sources of information for the 
process of innovation: universities; governmental research institutes or non-profit organizations; 
x Complementarity: importance given to the lack of information on technology as an obstacle to innovation; 
x Cooperation: variable that assumes a value of 1 if the firm cooperates with suppliers, customers, 
competitors, commercial laboratories or R&D companies, universities and government research or private non-
profit institutes; 
x Cooperation with competitors: variable that assumes a value of 1 if the firm cooperates with competitors; 
x Cooperation with research institutes: variable that assumes a value of 1 if the firm cooperates with 
commercial laboratories or R&D companies, universities and government research or private non-profit institutes; 
x Cooperation with suppliers or consumers: variable that assumes a value of 1 if the firm cooperates with 
suppliers or consumers; 
x Cost & Risk: sum of scores of the importance given to the following obstacles to the process of innovation: 
high innovation costs; lack of appropriate sources of funding; perception of excessive economic risk; 
x Export intensity: ratio between the export revenue and total revenue of the firm; 
x Incoming spillovers: sum of scores of the importance given to the following sources of information for the 
innovation process: conferences, professional meetings and journals; exhibitions;  
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x Appropriability at industry level: average of appropriability at the industry level; 
x Industry-level cooperation: average industry level cooperation; 
x Industry level cooperation with research institutes: average of cooperation with research institutes at the 
industry level; 
x Industry level cost & risk: Average cost and risk at the level of industry; 
x Industry level incoming spillovers: average incoming spillovers at the industry level; 
x Industry level legal protection: average of legal protection at the level of the industry. The legal protection 
is the sum of the scores of the following methods of legal protection for inventions or innovations: patents; 
standard design registration; trademarks; copyright; 
x Industry level R&D intensity: average intensity of R&D at the industry level; 
x Intensity of R&D: ratio between expenditure on R&D and total revenue; 
x Firm size: neperian logarithm of the number of employees; 
x Innovative firm: dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if the firm has introduced new products or 
processes, or has significantly improved them; 
x Net revenues: gross revenue from the sales of industrial products and services, minus taxes on sales; 
x Total revenue: gross revenue from the sales of industrial products and services; 
x Value of industrial transformation: difference between the total revenue and the cost of industrial 
operations; 
x FOB value of exportation: value of exportations covering costs and risks up to shipment; 
x Internal R&D expenditure: value of expenditure on R&D activities carried out by the firm; 
x External R&D expenditure: value of expenditure on R&D activities carried out by third parties; 
x R&D private funding: percentage participation of private funding in the total investment in R&D; 
x R&D public funding: percentage participation of public funding in the total investment in R&D; 
  
3. Results and Discussion  
3.1. Determinants of R&D cooperation in manufacturing firms 
Table 1 shows the results of the estimated model for the determinants of R&D cooperation. The significance of 
the Wald test indicates that the estimated model has good quality of fit, which means that the covariates present in 
the model explain the propensity of the firms investigated to cooperate for R&D. Table 1 also shows the 
explanatory variables considered endogenous and the instruments included in the model. 
 
Table 1: Determinants of R&D cooperation of manufacturing firms and their marginal effects (ME)-Brazil,2008 
 Coefficient z p > |z| ME z p > |z| 
Appropriability -0.324*** -2.12 0.001 -0.120*** -2.83 0.002 
Costs &Risks 0.252** 1.92 0.027 0.094* 1.43 0.076 
Incoming Spillovers 3.326*** 14.54 0.000 1.236*** 10.67 0.000 
Intensity of R&D 0.574 0.86 0.389 0.213 0.88 0.379 
Firm size 0.058*** 11.19 0.000 0.022*** 9.24 0.000 
Complementarity 0.108 0.50 0.620 0.040 0.50 0.618 
Industry level protection -0.137 -0.06 0.948 -0.051 -0.06 0.948 
Industry level cooperation -0.039 -0.02 0.985 -0.014 -0.02 0.985 
Constant -2.525 -4.77 0.000    
Wald chi2(8) = 436.83 - N = 747 - Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Instrumentalized: Incoming spillovers     
Instruments: 
 
All exogenous variables, plus R&D basicity, intensity of exportation, incoming spillovers, 
appropriability and industry level intensity of R&D and costs & risks. 
Source: research results. 
Notes: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%. ***significant at 1%. 
  
 The variables appropriability, sharing of costs and risks, incoming spillovers and firm size are statistically 
significant in explaining the propensity to cooperate in such firms. With the exception of the significance of 
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appropriability, these results converge with those obtained by López (2006) and Cassiman and Vergelers (2002), 
who studied the Belgian and Spanish manufacturing industry, respectively. The statistical insignificance of R&D 
intensity concurs with their results as well. 
 In López (2006) and Cassiman and Vergelers (2002), appropriability has a positive effect on the likelihood that 
an innovative manufacturing firm will seek cooperation agreements to carry out its R&D activities. Theoretically, 
however, the effectiveness of the strategies to protect commercially sensitive information does not have a clear 
effect on the likelihood of cooperation. 
 On the one hand, the importance given to the strategic methods of protection could demonstrate that a company 
has learned to control information flows, which increases the likelihood of this company taking advantage of 
cooperation agreements. However, the importance given to such methods can also express a company's 
preoccupation with potential free-riders on its R&D efforts. In this case, appropriability will have a negative 
correlation with the likelihood of cooperation for R&D. 
 Table 1 also shows the marginal effects of the determinants of cooperation on the propensity to cooperate. The 
incoming spillovers present the greatest marginal effect (1.236) on the likelihood of a firm engaging in a 
cooperation agreement. This presumably happens because the greater the importance given to incoming 
information flows, the greater the scope of learning from R&D cooperation agreements and, therefore, the greater 
the marginal benefit from cooperation. 
 The determinant with the second greatest marginal effect (-0.120) on the decision to cooperate is 
appropriability. As already discussed, the considerable importance given to the use of strategic methods to control 
information flows may express the firm’s concern with regard to free-riding on its R&D efforts.  Despite the slight 
marginal effect, the statistical significance of the determinant sharing of costs & risks sharing seems to be related 
to the lack of external private financing and venture capital investment, in addition to the perception of the high 
risks of innovative activities. 
 The significance of the determinant size indicates the importance given to the skills and absorptive capacity of 
firms. The larger the firm, the greater its acquired skills and absorptive capacity and thus the more likely it is to 
benefit from cooperation for R&D.   
Table 2 shows the results of the analysis of the determinants of the R&D cooperation of innovative companies 
in the manufacturing industry with universities and research institutes. Compared with the context of overall 
cooperation (Table 1), the variable sharing of costs and risks loses significance, while the variables 
complementarity and industry level legal protection gain significance. 
As in general cooperation and in cooperation with competitors, in the case of universities and research institutes 
the variable appropriability also presents a significant negative effect on the propensity to cooperate. This result 
reinforces the importance given to information flows, including incoming spillovers and concern with a possible 
free-riding effect. 
The positive effect of the industry level legal protection in cooperation with universities and research institutes 
also reinforces the importance given to information flows. A low level of legal protection in an industry can 
encourage free-riding behavior in investment in R&D of other firms, which explains its positive effect on that 
decision. Along with the effects of appropriability and incoming spillovers, the positive effects of the level of legal 
protection in the industry shows that the activity of cooperation with universities and research institutes is a 
method of internalization of external flows of knowledge in industries where legal protection is commonly used, 
and in firms for which information flows and strategic methods of controlling such streams are important. 
The analysis of the marginal effects (ME) reported in Table 2 shows that the most important factors determining 
the propensity to cooperate with universities and research institutes are, respectively, industry level legal 
protection, appropriability and incoming spillovers. 
Company size as well as complementarities are also determining factors of a firm’s cooperation with 
universities and research institutes. This result was expected. It shows that the higher the technological know-how 
and skills accumulated by a firm, the more likely it is to engage in a cooperation agreement. 
These results converge with those obtained by López (2006), with the exception of the positive and significant 
effect of appropriability. This difference reveals a discrepancy in the importance given to strategic methods of 
control of commercially sensitive information between Brazilian and Spanish firms. 
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Table 2: Determinants of R&D cooperation of manufacturing firms with universities and research institutes and 
their marginal effects (ME) – Brazil, 2008            
   Coefficient  z  p > |z|  ME  z  p > |z|  
Appropriability  -4.126***  -23.20   0.000  -1.646***   -23.00   0.000  
Costs & Risks 0.208  1.13  0.257  0.083  1.13  0.257  
Incoming 
Spillovers  
0.614***  3.38  0.001  0.245***   3.37  0.001  
Intensity of R&D  1.497  1.09  0.274  0.597  1.09  0.274  
Firm size - ln(po)  0.158***  4.16  0.000  0.063***   4.19  0.000  
Complementarity  0.328**  2.30  0.021  0.131**  2.31  0.021  
Industry level 
protection  
4.915**  2.11  0.035  1.960**  2.11  0.035  
Industry level 
cooperation   
-1.347  -0.81  0.418  -0.537  -0.81  0.418  
Constant  -0.891  -2.64  0.008        
Wald chi2(8) = 814.69 - Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 -N = 747    
Instrumentalized:  Appropriability            
Instruments:  
   
   
All exogenous variables, plus R&D basicity, intensity of exportation, incoming spillovers, 
appropriability, and industry level intensity of R&D and costs & risks.  
Source: research results.                 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
 
In summary, appropriability had a negative effect on the propensity to cooperate, while incoming spillovers had 
a positive effect, except in cooperation with suppliers and customers. Sharing of costs and risks was significant in 
the general model and in cooperation with suppliers and customers. Firm size  lost its significance in cooperation 
with competitors and complementarities were significant only in cooperation with suppliers and customers and 
with universities and research institutes. 
Despite being a relevant factor for the generation of absorptive capacity, intensity of R&D was not a significant 
factor in the estimated models. 
 
4.2. Impact of R&D cooperation on the performance of processing industry firms 
The estimated propensity scores in the Probit models presented and discussed in the previous sections were 
subsequently used to pair the innovative firms which engaged in cooperation agreements for R&D and those which 
did not. After the pairing, the performance of cooperating and non-cooperating innovative firms was assessed by 
calculating the average treatment effect (ATT), considering the variables of interest.  
Among the non-observable factors which can influence the propensity to cooperate for R&D, López (2006) 
mentions management quality and capacity, form of governance of the R&D activities, geographical proximity and 
accessibility to a technologically intensive area, besides the occurrence of prior R&D agreements, duration of 
cooperation activities and frequency of interactions with the same partner. 
Table 3 presents the estimated monetary impacts of the R&D cooperation of innovative firms with universities 
and research institutes. Given the significance of the impact on total and net revenues of a firm, the effect on VIT 
(a variable calculated by the difference between the gross value of production and the cost of industrial production) 
does not allow us to identify the possible impact of R&D cooperation on production costs.  
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Table 3: Impact of R&D cooperation with universities or research institutes on the performance of manufacturing 
firms (selected variables) – Brazil, 2008, R$               
Variables Cooperating Non-cooperating Difference t statistic 
Net revenue   1,512,322 629,894 882,428** 2.19 
Total revenue 1,737,724 686,681 1,051,043** 2.27 
Value of industrial 
transformation – VIT 
629,465 276,758 352,707** 1.99 
Source: research results.                 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
       
Although the study by Aschhoff and Schmidt (2008) differs from the present one in some of the parameters 
analyzed, their results agree with those presented in Table 5. These authors conclude that, when compared to non-
cooperative firms, a larger share of the revenue of innovative firms which engage in cooperation for R&D is due to 
new products while a larger share of cost reduction is due to process innovation. In particular, Aschhoff and 
Schmidt (2008) conclude that R&D cooperation with universities and research institutes has a positive effect on 
the rate of success of firms launching new products on the market, while R&D cooperation with competitors leads 
to greater cost reductions in innovation processes. 
In this study, the positive impact of R&D cooperation with universities and research institutes on the revenues 
of Brazilian innovative firms is also an indication of an enhanced rate of success in launching new products. 
Despite the positive effect on firms’ net revenues the direct impact of their innovation costs remains inconclusive. 
 
4. Conclusions  
Cooperation for R&D among private firms and between these firms and the public sector stimulates the 
generation and spreading of spillovers between these economic agents and is regarded as essential for the 
economic growth and enhanced performance of the national innovation system. In addition to information and 
knowledge flows, the literature has identified three other primary reasons for firms to engage in cooperation 
agreements for R&D: sharing of costs and risks; complementarities or sharing skills; and factors related to the 
absorptive capacity of the firm. 
The present research investigated the factors associated with the decisions of firms in the Brazilian 
manufacturing industry to engage in R&D cooperation activities and examined the impact of such decisions on 
their economic performance. 
The results suggest that appropriability (as an indication of the importance given to strategic methods of 
protection of information flows) is an key determinant of the decision to cooperate. The great importance given to 
appropriability reveals firms’ concern about free-riding effects on their efforts to research and develop. Thus 
defined, appropriability has a negative effect on the likelihood that a firm will cooperate for R&D. The majoe 
importance given to information flows in the decision to cooperate for R&D is also revealed by the significance of 
incoming spillovers and complementarities as determinants of those decisions. 
The significance of the sharing of costs and risks determinant could possibly be associated with the lack of 
outside private funding and venture capital investment, in addition to the perception of high risks associated with 
the innovative activity. The significance of the size variable exposes the importance of the skills and absorptive 
capacity of firms.   
Sharing of costs and risks, incoming spillovers, and complementarities proved to be relevant in determining the 
decision on the R&D cooperation of manufacturing firms in the subsector of high technological intensity. Another 
significant event in the analysis of the R&D cooperation of this group of technological intensity firms is that the 
intensity of R&D, i.e., the absorptive capacity gained through the efforts to research and develop their own firms 
was relevant in determining the propensity to cooperate for R&D with competitors and with universities and 
research institutes.   
The impact analysis showed that the R&D cooperation of Brazilian innovative manufacturing firms with 
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universities and research institutes leads to higher rates of success for new products launched by these firms. This 
indication arises out of the positive impact of the R&D cooperation on the revenues of firms, even though the 
impact on the cost reduction of innovative processes remained inconclusive. The same impact of the R&D 
cooperation with universities and research institutes was seen for innovative firms with both high and low intensity 
in technology. 
As R&D cooperation with universities and research institutes generates positive impacts on the economic 
performance of the manufacturing firms, public investments in basic research and knowledge diffusion aimed at 
specific sectors, policies encouraging the formation of a venture capital market for funding R&D activities. Action 
designed to improve the relationship between the public and the private sectors are potentially useful mechanisms 
for fostering productivity gains and economic growth in the manufacturing industry. 
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